Iran: Shiite Storm

Iran through its sponsorship of the Syrian regime and Hezbollah are creating a stable arch of Shi’a allies. This is causing growing concern in the Middle East and the wider international community.

Syrians hold a placard lampooning (L – R) Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Kafranbel near Idlib, Syria.

Arash Karami is an editor for al-monitor’s Iran pulse. He relays a censored and removed article that was published about the comments of a former commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). General Hussein Hamedani announced Iran’s plan to form an Iranian committee to help rebuild Syria and the establishment of a second Hezbollah inside Syria. He also refers to Iran’s military support of the Assad regime and the importance of Syria as a geopolitical battleground.

According to Hamedani, recent discussions in Tehran determined the amount of support that would be given to Syria, as well as a plan for Iranian provinces to align with Syrian provinces in order to restore state.

Hamedani asked the Iranian people to view the civil war in Syria as they do the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, where civilians rallied to defend their own country in what became known as the “Sacred Defence”. He urged Iranians to fight in the Syrian war because it has now reached the same stage as the “Sacred Defence”.

Hamedani referred Syria is a geopolitical battleground, and the subsequent key to the balance of power in the region. On one side are Russia, China and Iran, and in the other are Arab states, the United States and Europe.

Karami’s article highlights the complexity of the Middle East. He relays the comments from Hamedani well but leaves many aspects open for consideration.

Has Hamedani made these comments to achieve the support of the Iranian people? Is it a strategic step to gain greater influence in the throughout the Middle East region? Are they attempting to strengthen their relationship with Syria and Hezbollah?

Hamedani is attempting to rally the support of the Iranian people in a strategic step towards gaining greater influence in region. The battle for Syria is rooted in Iran’s perceived role as the leading Shiite revolutionary power. But is this bad?

Some argue against a powerful relationship between Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. However, compared to the alternative outcome it may not be so bad. If the insurgents do succeed in Syria, the civilians and the region could be left with a much worse situation to deal with, similar to that which is occurring in Iraq at the moment. If Assad falls the void could be filled with insurgent groups tied to al-Qaeda and jihadists.

It poses the question of the greater evil. If Assad wins the war will a powerful leadership between Assad, Khamenei and Hezbollah be worse than what could take control of Syria and the wider region? Although Syria and Iran are governed by authoritarian regimes if Assad and Khamenei gained control it could be a more stable and viable outcome in the future.

Although Iran is governed by an authoritarian regime, it does have a number of democratic rules. Corruption and inequality still hinder the state from achieving more democratic values, but there has been an improvement in women’s rights and access to education. Similarly before the Syrian War, Assad was loosening his control and allowing more freedom with fewer restrictions. It is possible that the government could one day return to this, but Assad may be skeptical in allowing citizens more freedom once the brutal war ends.

It is difficult to foresee the possible out come of relationship between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. But if Iran does follow through with its plans to help rebuild Syria after the end of the war, surely this is a good outcome? Whether they use their alliance to suppress other religions and abuse human rights is another question.

This article in particular evokes many unanswerable questions. It highlights the complexity of the Middle East and the almost impossible task of predicting the future of the region.

Iraq: The Devastating Reality

The violence that erupted after the fall of Saddam had devastating and long lasting effects on Iraq. Fuelled by religion and ethnicity, it gave rise to insurgent groups and soon escalated into a full-scale civil war. In the period between 2003-2006 it is estimated that between 104 000 – 223 000 civilians were killed. Although violence and insurgency peaked in 2006, it still remains a principle challenge for the fragmented state today.

Armed Insurgents chant against the the government, 2014.

Memlik Pasha is a journalist who focuses on news and analysis of the Iraq insurgency and Syrian civil war. In his Vice News article he discusses the severity of religious schism and insurgency that is engulfing the Iraqi state.

“Some ten years after it first began, the Iraqi insurgency has been fully reborn, and the conflict is escalating into a bloody new phase.”

Recently, insurgent groups with ties to al-Qaeda have been taking over cities in the Anbar region as a means of political gain and control. After the withdrawal of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the army from this region, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) took control of Fallujah and most of Ramadi, declaring the Anbar region an Islamic emirate.

Pasha argues that Iraq faces a long period of instability. As tensions rise between ISIS, Maliki’s government and other insurgent groups, the possibility of another bloody scuffle is on everyone’s minds.

Furthermore Abdullah al-Janabi, a radical cleric has returned to preach in mosques. Al-Janabi used to lead the Mujahideen Shura Council in Fallujah, which was established by al Qaeda in Iraq. He has previously been known to set up Sharia courts whose punishments “made the Taliban look soft.”

Pasha claims that ISIS has captured large quantities of Iraqi army equipment and also learnt from their mistakes in 2006 following the Anbar Awakening. They had previously lost a lot of support from local tribes and insurgents who were resentful of ISIS’ brutal domination. This time they have taken a far more conciliatory approach with their stratergy.

ISIS insurgents have taken control of the vast rural areas around the West and South of Bagdad. In a maneuver, previously used in 2006 and 2007, to encircle the capital and gain control.

The violence and insurgency that precipitated after the fall of Saddam is not over yet. In fact it seems as if it is going to escalate into a full-scale, deadly and devastating reality. The situation in Iraq seems worse than it was before the fall of Saddam. With most of the country controlled by al-Qaeda, and a severe lack of infrastructure and political stability, the road to peace will be very windy.

Lebanon: on the edge of the Syrian Civil War

Lebanon is a complex state, riddled with diverse political and religious factions. This secular yet fractured state has endured numerous adversities including 20 years of occupation by Israel and Syria and 15 years of bloody, multifaceted civil war. Not to mention the influx of more than 750 000 Syrian refugees who have fled to Lebanon as a result of the ongoing conflict in Syria. Lebanon’s complex social fabric and political instability impacts its domestic and regional security and also its economic development.

More recently, a major concern is the large number of militants fighting against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, who have been forced over the boarder into Lebanon. After the Syrian regime army gained control of Yabrud in the Qalamoun region, Syria, many of the militants sought refuge in Arsal, a town in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

The town of Arsal where many militants have fled. Arsal is just over the Syrian boarder, in Lebanon.

Jean Aziz is a columnist for Al-monitor’s Lebanon Pulse and the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar. He is also a lecturer at the American University of Technology and the Université Saint-Esprit De Kaslik in Lebanon. Aziz discusses the possible implications for Lebanon due to the Syrian militants who have fled over the boarder into Arsal. He discusses the potential political and military problems, and also the issues that could arise on a domestic, regional and international level.

The concern for Lebanon is that the Syrian conflict could spread, particularly throughout the surrounding towns in the Bekaa Valley. Arsal is a Sunni majority town, whereas neighbouring towns are predominately Shia. The potential for the conflict to spread throughout this volatile region, where conflicting religions exist, is high. There is also the risk that the militants will encourage more terrorist attacks and the spread of fundamentalism within Lebanon. Especially due to the recent increase in terrorist attacks. For example, the bombings in Tripoli which occurred in August 2013, as a result of Hezbollah intervention in Syria.

Aziz argues that the international community will be concerned with the threat of fundamentalist and terrorist growth in the region, and the safety of the UN deployed troops from France, Italy and Spain in the South of Lebanon. Particularly as UN troops have previously been targeted in terrorist attacks by extremists in Lebanon. Another international concern is the fear of the militants turning towards Israel, and carrying out attacks on their most Northern boarder.

At a regional level, resolving the security situation in Arsal will be keenly supported by many states in the region. Again to prevent the spread of fundamentalists and terrorists, and also to prevent another sectarian fuelled conflict. It will also be supported to prevent more instability in the region and maintain relations between states, particularly as the Saudi-Qatar relations are dwindling.

Finally at a domestic level, Lebanon will want to curb the potential of full-scale conflict breaking out. After the recent increase in terrorist attacks, Lebanon needs to prevent another sectarian conflict occurring. The difficulty in doing so will depend on Lebanon’s ability to unite its factions to prevent the spread conflict. As Aziz suggests, it is possible, with Hezbollah heavily supporting the Assad regime and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s team wanting to continue good relations with Saudi Arabia and prevent the spread of extremism throughout Sunni Islam. However, Hariri’s team and other Lebanese factions have previously been reluctant to get involved with the Syrian crisis, which could pose a problem in term of confronting the militants.

The main concern is whether Lebanon can unite its fractured state in order to tackle the militants together. And whether they can do this before terrorist attacks and extremism spreads. Moreover, Lebanon must consider the potential for secular fighting to breakout again. Despite the Syrian war and Lebanon’s civil war, they will have to unite to stop the militants in order to prevent the situation from escalating into a wider, more devastating conflict.